For many countries, remittance behaviour by migrants is an important component of their overall international financial flows. To date, the empirical literature has analysed the propensity to remit as a function of migrants' socio-economic characteristics. However, no studies have fully addressed the empirical implications of remittance behaviour being determined in the broader context of migrants' labour, income and consumption allocation strategy. On the contrary, the migrant's income has almost always been treated as exogenous in this context. The aim of this study is to estimate a remittance equation that detects the main determinants of remittance behaviour while addressing endogeneity and reverse causality relationships between remittances, income, consumption and savings. Moreover, since a large share of individuals do not remit money at all, an instrumental variable variant of the double-hurdle selection model is proposed and estimated by LIML.
Introduction
The history of industrialisation and economic development intertwines inextricably with the history of migration and remittance flows. In some countries, the industrial take-off was financed, directly and indirectly, by the remittances of their emigrants. For example, in Italy during the the first 15-year period of the twentieth century the average amount of remittance was estimated to be around 450 million lire per year, a value greater than the annual internal revenue from tax on earned income (De Clementi, 1994; Masullo, 2001) , approaching 6 percent of the Italian GDP (Esteves and KhoudurCastéras, 2009 ). In other countries, the immigrants' labour supply, consumption, investments and the stimulus they produced to national savings and foreign capital were primary growth engines (Hatton and Williamson, 1998; Solimano, 2003) .
Nowadays, the situation is not very different from the past. Remittance flows represent a major source of income and foreign exchange revenue for many developing countries. According to the Migration and Remittances Factbook, remittance flows to developing countries increased from 84.5 billion US dollars to 221.3 billion in 2006, representing 1.9% of developing countries GDP, 22% of global foreign direct investments and almost 245% of official development aid. At the same time, for immigration countries remittances can be a sizeable and costly outflow of capital. For example, remittance outflows from Australia rose from 1,053 million US dollars in 2000 to 2,815 million in 2006 (equivalent to 0.4% of GDP) 1 .
In this perspective, a proper understanding of the individual motivations and determinants of remitting behaviour is a key step in analysing the dynamics of remittance flows at the aggregate level and in designing policies to attract remittances from abroad or, conversely, to keep incomes and savings of migrants in the host country. In this paper, we analyse the remittance strategy of a panel of immigrants coming to Australia from 125 different countries. We estimate a simultaneous-equation model with double censoring, where immigrants' earnings, consumption and remittances are jointly determined. Moreover, we test whether the financial development and institutional quality of the country of origin boost or weaken migrants' propensity to remit.
In their path-breaking study on motivations to remit, Lucas and Stark (1985) suggest a taxonomy distinguishing three main drives of remittances: "pure altruism", when migrants derive utility from the utility of family and friends at home, "pure self-interest", when migrants are moved by the desire to acquire material and immaterial (reputation, prestige) assets at home; "tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest", when remittances are the result of contractual arrangements between migrants and parents left at home enforced by a mix of altruistic and self-interested forces 2 .
The pure altruistic attention to looking after close relatives in the origin-country is certainly the motive for remitting which is most cited and studied in the literature (Johnson and Whitelaw, 1974; Banerjee, 1984) . However, remittances can also reflect a sort of payment for goods and services received by migrants from parents and friends in the home country. For example, remittances can be the repayment of investments in migrants' education, transfer expenses to the destination country and other migration costs met by the family of origin (Brown, 1997; Poirine, 1997) . In addition, while abroad, migrants may ask relatives to take care of their land, house or children and the money sent is a funding element of this exchanging scheme (Cox, Eser, and Jimenez, 1998) . Finally, remitting behaviour can be an investment strategy in inheritance, where migrants remit to guarantee themselves the possibility to inherit once parents die (Hoddinott, 1992) , or it may be the result of a broader intra-familial insurance arrangement to reduce the effects of income volatility in developing countries (de la Briere, Sadoulet, de Janvry, and Lambert, 2002) .
Discriminating among remittance motivations empirically has proved to be a very challenging task. Theoretical predictions on remittance determinants seldom translate into clear-cut empirical tests. On the other hand, available datasets are often largely incomplete, devoid of a time profile and collected either at the sending or receiving end, hence lacking important information to match migrants' and recipients' households 3 . Moreover, any attempts to build empirical models, capable of identifying the driving factors behind remittance behaviour in a satisfactory way, have been stumped by the problems of the endogeneity of the major determinants of remittances and the influence of unobserved third factors.
Recently, a few studies have addressed the issues of reverse causation and omitted variables with regard to the wealth and income of relatives back home (Osili, 2007; Yang and Choi, 2007) and the migrants' intention to return to the home country (Dustmann and Mestres, 2009) . Surprisingly enough, however, no previous studies have been concerned with the endogeneity of immigrants' income 4 and saving behaviour 5 . Yet it is highly conceivable that people who wish to remit a greater amount of money agree to increase the number of hours worked per week. In addition, greater earnings by immigrants in the host country are arguably the output of the unobserved family-of-origin investments in their education, thereby causing a (gratitude or money) debt for immigrants that remittances repay. Similar concerns hold for consumption: immigrants could choose to reduce consumption in the host country in order to increase transfers to the home country or could prefer to invest their savings in earning assets rather than in buying property or other durables.
In this paper, we set remittances in the broader context of work and consumption 3 An exception is represented by the paper by Osili (2007) , where migrants are considered together with their respective origin-families. Such complete information, on the other hand, comes together with a very limited number of observations (61 pairs). 4 A notable exception is Hoddinott (1994) . However, in that paper the problem is dealt with simply by showing that for Hoddinott's dataset the Hausman exogeneity test fails to reject the null hypothesis that migrants' earnings are exogenous. 5 A number of papers have analysed remittance and saving decisions of migrants jointly (Merkle and Zimmermann, 1992; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006; Sinning, 2007; Dustmann and Mestres, 2009 ). However, without exception, these papers proceed by estimating separate reduced-form models for the different types of transfers and savings, among which the income of migrants can be allocated.
decisions, by estimating a three-equation model. The censored nature of remittances is dealt with by using a double-hurdle model (Cragg, 1971) . This model is similar to the better known Tobit and Heckit models, typically used in the remittance literature (Funkhouser, 1995; Brown, 1997; Aggarwal and Horowitz, 2002) ; in fact, it nests Tobit as a special case, and arguably provides higher generality than both, since absence of remittances by an individual may be ascribed either to unwillingness or to a financial constraint. However, this choice also poses an econometric issue. Although considered by theoretical econometric literature (Blundell and Smith, 1994) , the double-hurdle model with instrumental variables has not yet been used in the applied literature: in this paper, we develop a LIML estimator for the double-hurdle model with endogenous regressors, so as to address endogeneity and the selection mechanism at the same time.
In the second part of the paper, we exploit the cross-country dimension of our data set to explore the relationship between the flow of remittances and the financial sector and institutional development in the home country. While a growing number of macro studies are devoted to the finance-and institutions-remittance nexus 6 , as far as we know, ours is the first paper in the literature which provides microeconometric evidence on the causal effect of the development of formal financial intermediaries and the quality of institutions on migrants' remittances.
By way of preview, although our results cannot exclude the existence of an altruistic motivation to remit, they indicate a prevalence of the exchange motives in governing immigrant remittances. First, once endogeneity is taken into account, the hypothesis of unit elasticity of remittances to pre-transfer income (predicted by the selfish model) cannot be rejected, while individual consumption is negatively correlated to remittances. Second, the amount of money sent to the country of origin increases with immigrants' education but the likelihood of remittances does not, which is consistent with the loan repayment hypothesis. Third, the home country per capita GDP (that we use as a proxy for the pre-transfer recipients' income) positively affects the amount transferred but decreases the likelihood of remittances, once again in line with the exchange hypothesis.
As for the macro-determinants of immigrant remittances, a well-developed financial sector in the country of origin seems to exert a positive effect on remittances. In the same way, lower financial risk in the home country is positively correlated with the amount remitted. By contrast, remittances seem to be positively correlated to higher political and economic risks, which suggests the existence of a sort of substitution effect between financial assistance to home-family and the quality of local institutions.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the doublehurdle maximum likelihood estimator with instrumental variables. In Section 3, we provide a detailed description of our dataset, the variables and the models we estimate. Results are presented in Sections 4 and 6. In Section 7, we conclude.
Econometric methods

Motivation
The task of building an empirical model for migrants' remittances is a complex one: on the one hand, one has to take into account the fact that the decision of whether to remit money at all may be partly separated from the decision on the amount of the remittance. 7 On the other, the latter decision is likely to be made jointly with other choices on labour supply and consumption.
The first aspect can be dealt with by using empirical models with some form of endogenous censoring, such as the Heckman selection model (Hoddinott, 1994; Aggarwal and Horowitz, 2002) . In our view, however, it is more appropriate to use a doublehurdle model, since an individual who does not send money abroad is not necessarily uninterested in doing so, but may be constrained by lack of financial resources.
The double-hurdle model is a commonly employed technique for estimating models with double censoring. In the literature, the earliest reference is Cragg (1971) , in which the following model is analysed:
In its original formulation, the two disturbances were assumed to be independent Gaussian variates (of course, V(u i ) = 1 is assumed for identification). Hence the name "independent double-hurdle" model. Subsequent literature has extended the base model in a number of ways, the most notable of which is doubtlessly the so-called "dependent" model, in which the zero correlation constraint between u i and ε i is removed and the two disturbance terms are assumed distributed as
This model has been used in countless applications, such as labour market studies (the classic reference here is Blundell, Ham, and Meghir (1987) , but recent examples are Cardoso, Fontainha, and Monfardini (2008) or Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2007) ) or, most notably, demand analysis for certain type of goods such as tobacco or alcohol, from Jones (1989) onwards. Estimation is typically carried out by maximum likelihood 8 . The use of a double-hurdle model in the empirical modelling of transfer decisions, although uncommon, is not new: a double-hurdle model is used in a similar context by Cox, Eser, and Jimenez (1998) , via a somewhat ad-hoc two-step method instead of maximum likelihood. A recent paper by Sinning (2007) also uses a double-hurdle model, but only in its restricted independent version. Neither article tackles the problem of endogeneity of the explanatory variables.
The double-hurdle model with endogenous regressors
In order to accommodate the problem at hand, the above model must be modified to handle endogenous regressors in equation (1). The general problem of the estimation of simultaneous-equation systems with censoring has been comprehensively analysed in Blundell and Smith (1994) . However, our problem is considerably simpler: as an explicit reduced form exists 9 , estimation can be carried out via a LIML-like strategy. Assume you have
where s * i is the latent "hurdle" variable (in our context, the latent propensity to remit), Y i is the vector of endogenous regressors (in our context, pre-transfer immigrants' income and consumption) and Z i = (X 1i , X 2i ) is the vector of exogenous variables.
The reduced form for (s
As u i has unit variance and
which is our structural relation. Note that ε i may be correlated to η i (causing endogeneity) and/or to u i (giving rise to the dependent double-hurdle model, as opposed to Cragg's formulation). Assume now that the correlation between ε i and η i can be modelled as
which, for example, would be the case under joint normality. This way, v i is linearly independent from η i , although it may be correlated with u i . As a consequence, we have
9 See Blundell and Smith (1994) , footnote 1.
With the joint normality assumption, one may write
Conditionally on η i (that is, treating Y i as given), the censoring mechanism works exactly as in the ordinary double-hurdle model: define a binary variable
where I(A) = 1 if A is true and 0 if A is false. The observed amount of remittances is R i = d i y * i , which reads as: an individual will send a positive amount overseas only if she intends to do so in the first place (s * i > 0) and has enough money to do it (y * i > 0). This variable may be rewritten as
Hence,
where Φ 2 (·) is the cumulative distribution function of the double normal, σ 2 = V(v i ) and the ρ is the correlation between w i and v i . Hence, the log-likelihood (conditional on η i ) for individual i can be written as
The full log-likelihood can be recovered by adding to c i the marginal log-likelihood for η i , which is
It is worth noting that we are not estimating a structural form for the selection equation, but rather its unrestricted reduced form. In our opinion, the theoretical arguments which suggest treating income and consumption as endogenous in the remittance equation do not apply in the selection equation (5): the selection equation models the ex ante psychological propensity of an individual to send money abroad and imposing overidentifying restrictions here would be adventurous at best.
Numerical issues
Since the first-order conditions for a maximum cannot be solved analytically, a numerical maximisation procedure is needed 10 . Although our estimation technique is a fairly straightforward application of numerical maximum likelihood, in some cases standard numerical procedures may not yield optimal results, since the log-likelihood function may have multiple maxima. Consistency of maximum likelihood estimators is known to stem from the fact that the expected value of the log-likelihood has a unique maximum at θ 0 and uniform convergence of the observed log-likelihood to its expectation 11 . However, the observed log-likelihood may well have multiple maxima in finite samples. In these cases, it is reasonable to take the global maximum as the ML estimator. Numerical methods, however, do not guarantee that the algorithm stops at the global maximum, since they may get stuck in a local maximum.
With our dataset, we found that in several instances this was indeed the case. For some specifications, there were two maxima, corresponding to two different values of the correlation coefficient ρ. 12 In order to circumvent this problem, we used the following computational strategy: given a value of ρ, carry out the maximum likelihood estimation of the remaining parameters, thus obtaining a restricted estimateψ(ρ) (where ψ is a vector gathering all the other parameters). This procedure was repeated over a grid of values for ρ from -0.9 to 0.9 with increments of 0.1; the value ofψ(ρ) yielding the maximum likelihood was then used as the starting point for the maximisation of the unrestricted log-likelihood. We found this procedure to be mildly time-consuming, but very effective. 10 We used the BFGS implementation provided by gretl; see Cottrell and Lucchetti (2009) . In order to ensure that parameter σ remains positive during the numerical search, the log-likelihood is reparametrised in terms of ln σ. For similar reasons, the unconstrained parameters on which the marginal log-likelihood function m i is based are not the elements of Σ itself, but rather those of the Cholesky factorisation of Σ −1 . In practice, m i , the second component of the log-likelihood, is computed as
. This has two advantages: not only is a matrix inversion avoided, but the determinant of K (which is by construction |Σ| −1/2 ) is trivial to compute since K is triangular, via
Finally, the correlation coefficient between u i and v i was reparametrised via the hyperbolic tangent transformation as
Hypothesis testing
Once estimation is carried out, it becomes possible to test for several hypotheses: the hypothesis of exogeneity of Y i , which is particularly interesting for the interpretation of the results, can be easily carried out via a Wald test on θ and poses no particular problems.
Another test of interest is a test for the over-identification restrictions implied by equation (7). This has no obvious economic interpretation, but is nevertheless important to judge the appropriateness of the choice of instruments. To see how the test is carried out, substitute (6) and (8) into (7) to get
once the structural parameters are estimated by LIML, all it takes is to compute the score matrix of the unrestricted model for the corresponding values of µ 1 , µ 2 and µ 3 and perform a score (conditional moment) test via an OPG artificial regression (see Davidson and MacKinnon (1984) ).
Testing for the existence and the actual working of the selection mechanism is a more complex matter: on the one hand, it should be ascertained whether a selection mechanism is in fact present. This could be accomplished by comparing the double-hurdle model to an ordinary Tobit model. On the other, a comparison with a sample selection modelà la Heckman would shed light on the nature of censoring. If a Heckit-type censoring occurred, then each individual who chooses to remit would generate a non-zero figure for the actual remittances sent; put differently, zero remittances would indicate unambiguously that the individual has no intention to remit money home, and there are no individuals who are financially constrained. By contrast, if the censoring mechanism is double-hurdle, zero remittances could result from potential, but income-constrained remitters. The difference between the Tobit, Heckit and double-hurdle models can be illustrated considering Figure 1 . An individual is represented by a point on the plane, where the Xaxis indicates the amount that the individual could afford to send abroad and the Y-axis indicates her psychological propensity to make remittances. The Tobit model assumes that non-remitters belong to the area A or, equivalently, that areas B and C contain no individuals (anyone would remit if they could); in the Heckman sample selection model observable non-remitters belong to areas B and C and no individuals belong to A (so that the only thing that matters is the a priori decision whether to remit or not). In the double-hurdle model, a non-remitter could belong to any of the three areas A, B and C: there may be some people who, although inclined to make remittances, cannot afford to.
Testing procedures to discriminate between competing models of selection are more difficult to set up for two reasons: first, the three models are non-nested (the doublehurdle model being of the dependent variety); second, a comparison on the structural form would entail estimation of IV varieties of the Tobit and Heckman model, which is far more difficult than the ordinary. These difficulties were circumvented by running Vuong's test (see Vuong (1989) ) for comparing non-nested models on the unrestricted reduced form of the three models. Vuong's test is used for comparing non-nested models in terms of the difference in their respective Kullback-Leibler distance from the (unknown) "true" model: define the log-likelihood-ratio for observation i as
) is the i-th contribution to log-likelihood for model A (B). Under the null hypothesis that the two models offer an equivalent representation of the data, the statistic
is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal random variable. Large positive (negative) values are taken as evidence in favour of model A (B).
Questionnaires cover different topics: the migrant's family in Australia, the immigration process, the initial settlement, financial assets and transfers (remittances), working status, income, consumption expenditures, education and English knowledge, health, citizenship and return visits to the former country. All this information gives an incomparable socio-economic picture of immigrants, that is essential to understand their remittance behaviour.
Individuals were interviewed three times between six months and three years from their arrival in Australia. In the first two waves remittances are designed as a discrete ordered variable, while in the third wave they are continuous. In principle, it would be possible to exploit all three waves by using an interval double-hurdle approach (Bettin and Lucchetti, 2009 ). However, the estimation of an instrumental variable interval double-hurdle model would be quite hard to implement. Moreover, we would lose precious information by transforming the continuous remittance variable from the third wave into a discrete one. Therefore, we chose to limit our analysis to the third wave.
The initial sample included 5,192 individuals, but due to sample attrition immigrants interviewed in the third wave fell to 3,752 (2,160 men and 1,592 women). The interviewees came from 125 countries. The most represented region is Asia, followed by Europe, Africa and the Middle East, which taken together represent the origin for almost 90% of immigrants in the sample. Table 5 shows that five out of the ten main countries of origin are located in South-East Asia, suggesting that geographic distance plays an important role in migration choices. However, the largest number of immigrants come from the United Kingdom (8.40% of the sample), which suggests that cultural affinities, common language and past colonial relationships also affect the locational choice of migrants.
In all, 1,154 immigrants (31%) responded positively when asked about their attitude towards remittances. Half of them sent less than 1000 AUS $ since the previous interview, while the average amount of money remitted is around 2,550 AUS $. Interestingly, there seems to be a pattern: immigrants from richer (poorer) countries are less (more) likely to send remittances, but if they do, they send larger (smaller) amounts (see Table  5 and Figure 2 ).
Analysing the number of remitters by country of birth, the Iraqis are the most likely to send money back home (62.5% of Iraqi immigrants in LSIA1) followed by the Afghans (58.7%) and the Filipinos (58%); the share of remitters is much lower for immigrants from high-income countries (as an example, the figure is 10.7% for the USA and 14.3% for the UK). Conversely, the average amount remitted by Japanese immigrants (11100 AUS $) is the largest in the sample, and is also much larger than the amount that immigrants coming from similar countries (in terms of per capita GDP) like the UK, Germany or Italy send back home. By contrast, among poor countries Cambodians' remittances (1061 AUS $) are lower than the average. groups and by individual countries of birth.
The empirical model 3.2.1 Remittance equation variables
The main remittance equation in the model we estimate is:
where R i is the amount of money sent home every year by the immigrant i 14 , Y i is the yearly pre-transfer income of immigrants' household in Australia and C i the yearly household's consumption expenditures (all variables are in logarithm). Consumption is calculated as the sum of all the different consumption items singled out in the questionnaire: food, transports, clothes, health, expenditures for the children and for the house (gas, electricity etc.). As immigrants' income and consumption are recorded by intervals in the survey, we take the midpoints of the intervals. X 1 is a vector of exogenous immigrant characteristics that theory and previous empirical literature indicate as possible explanatory variables of remittance behaviour: (i) the immigrant gender, by an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the immigrant is a male (MALE); (ii) the age of the immigrant and its square (AGE, AGE2); (iii) the time (in years) elapsing from the arrival in Australia (TIME); (iv) a citizenship indicator that takes the value of 1 if the immigrant has obtained, applied to obtain or has the intention to apply for Australian citizenship (CITIZENSHIP); (v) the formal qualification of the immigrant (SCHOOLING) proxied by four dummies corresponding to PhD/MA degree, BA degree or diploma, 10/12 years of schooling, and 9 or less years of schooling (the excluded category is the immigrant with a PhD or an MA degree); (vi) a dummy for the presence of close relatives in the country of origin 15 (RELATIVES).
Finally, Z j(i) includes variables relative to the home country j of individual i, which aim to capture parental family characteristics for which the LSIA survey does not keep records. In the baseline specification, we consider the log of the mean per capita GDP over the period 1992-2000 (GDP PC) as a proxy for the economic conditions of relatives at home 16 .
Furthermore, the log of the distance between Australia and the country of origin (DISTANCE) is considered because of its influence on the relations with the home country. Being far away raises the cost of visiting home and also reduces the frequency of contacts at a distance, due to different time zones, thus weakening the strength of altruistic feelings. At the same time both costs associated to migrating to the host country and to transferring money back to the origin family increase with the distance from the 14 In the questionnaire, immigrants were originally asked about the amount of money sent back home from the previous interview. However, since data concerning income and consumption are reported on a yearly basis, we also transformed remittances accordingly. In addition, there were a few observations reporting a positive amount of remittances but equal to 1 AUS $ per year. Since we interpreted these either as due to misreporting or as transfers whose rationale is beyond the scope of our analysis on the traditional motives to remit, we set them to zero. 15 It refers to partner/spouse, children, parents and siblings. 16 GDP data are from the World Development Indicators database.
home country 17 .
Other country-specific variables were also considered as possible additions to the baseline model. In particular, sections 5.3 and 6 contain an analysis of other several macroeconomic, financial and institutional quality indicators.
Instrumental variables
The set of instruments for pre-transfer immigrants' income Y i and consumption C i includes X 1i , Z j(i) and X 2i . The first two subsets contain the regressors just illustrated above for the remittance equation. X 2i , instead, is a vector of five variables to address endogeneity of income and consumption. The first two instruments refer to the knowledge of the English language. In particular, we build two indicator variables taking the value of 1 if the first spoken language of the immigrant is English (FIRST ENG) and if the immigrant states he/she has a good knowledge of English (GOOD ENG). The third instrument is a dummy variable stating whether the immigrant lives in an urban (CITY = 1) or a rural environment (CITY = 0). The last three instruments refer to the composition of the immigrant household in Australia: a dummy for the presence of children in the immigrant household (CHILD), a dummy for the presence of the partner in the immigrant household (SPOUSE) and log of the number of members in the immigrant household plus one (FAMILY N) 18 .
Our assumption is that a higher level of English proficiency would affect immigrants' income in a positive way but without any direct effect on remittance behaviour. Similarly, we expect the composition of the family in Australia to contribute to determining earned income and consumption patterns, and via such variables, remittances. In particular, we expect income to increase with the number of household members and with the presence of a partner and to decrease in the presence of children. Consumption, on the other hand, should be positively affected by all the three instruments regarding household composition. Finally, consumption patterns also depend on the location of residence and expenditures might be higher if the immigrant's household lives in an urban instead of a rural environment. This is especially the case for a country such as Australia where the outback is not densely populated.
4 Results: the baseline model
Income and consumption
In table 1 we report the results from our basic specification for the remittance model, while in table 7 in the Appendix we report the first-stage regressions for income and consumption.
All our instrumental variables have a very significant impact on income and consumption and estimated coefficients have the expected signs. In addition, the Wald test strongly rejects the hypothesis of exogeneity for income and consumption, suggesting of the importance of accounting for reverse causality and simultaneity between such variables and remittances, while the over-identification test supports the validity of the chosen instruments. The customary F-tests on the reduced forms show no sign of instrument weakness.
Moving on to the main equation of the remittance model, the amount of money transferred to the family of origin depends positively on migrants' pre-transfer income and negatively on consumption expenditure. Both coefficients are statistically significant at 1% level of confidence but the coefficient for consumption is almost twice as large (in modulus) than that for income. In particular, it is worth noting that the coefficient on income, measuring the elasticity of remittances to pre-transfer immigrant's income, is never significantly different from 1. This finding is at odds with predictions of pure altruistic models of remittances, while it is consistent with a pure exchange motivation to remit 19 . By contrast, the elasticity of remittances to consumption is approximately equal to −2. In addition, a joint test for β y = −β c rejects the null with a p-value of 0.0024. This means that, income and other regressors being equal, when immigrants increase their consumption what they cut is remittances more than savings in the host country. However, this also indicates that an increase in an immigrant's income followed by a proportionally identical increase in his/her consumption, leaving the average propensity to consume unchanged, results in a decrease in the amount of money he/she transfers to the family of origin.
Other determinants of remittances
The effects of immigrants' gender and age on remittances are broadly in line with the majority of previous studies. Male immigrants tend to transfer back home significantly greater amounts of money than females and are also more likely to remit 20 , while the age of immigrants is not significantly correlated with the intensity of transfers to the family of origin (Funkhouser, 1995; Osili, 2007; Dustmann and Mestres, 2009 ). However, older immigrants are more likely to remit, albeit at a decreasing pace 21 .
Time elapsing from the arrival of immigrants to Australia has no significant effect on remittance decisions. This is in accordance with previous findings of Brown (1997) , Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) and Dustmann and Mestres (2009) and is consistent with the altruistic motivation to remit, even if it should be noted that our sample 19 See the Appendix for simple models of altruistic and exchange motivations to remit. 20 The greater propensity to remit of males is consistent with the findings of (Funkhouser, 1995; Aggarwal and Horowitz, 2002; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006; Dustmann and Mestres, 2009) . By contrast, Lucas and Stark (1985) , Osaki (2003) and Naufal (2008) found that it is females who remit more. 21 A joint test of significance of AGE and AGE2 coefficients shows that the relation with the probability to remit is non-monotonic. An inverted U relationship between immigrants' age and remittances is also documented in Hoddinott (1994) and Clark and Drinkwater (2007) .
include only recently arrived immigrants. The citizenship status of immigrants can be relevant to explaining remittance decisions, even if its effects are ambiguous. For example, to the extent that application for citizenship indicates the willingness of immigrants to reside permanently, or for a long time, in the host country we expect a negative relationship with transfers to the home country. However, if the citizenship status goes along with more stable and protected occupations in the host country and with access to wider forms of social protection, we might observe that 'citizen' immigrants are more inclined to remit. Our findings confirm the existence of opposite effects for citizenship. In particular, we find that immigrants who did apply for Australian citizenship are more likely to remit but, on average, they also remit smaller sums. This suggests that they are more likely to consider Australia their permanent country of residence and relax contacts with the family of origin. At the same time, however, by being well integrated in Australian society, immigrants who have obtained Australian citizenship can afford to send money back home with higher frequency than non-citizen immigrants 22 .
With regard to schooling variables, we find that the probability of immigrants remitting money is not significantly correlated with their level of educational attainment. However, in the main equation the coefficients on schooling dummies are significantly negative and increasing in modulus, suggesting that, income being equal, the more educated are the immigrants the greater is the amount of money they transfer home. The positive correlation between education and remittances has been already documented in the literature by, for example, Lucas and Stark (1985) , Hoddinott (1994) , Funkhouser (1995) and Ilahi and Jafarey (1999) , and has been taken as an important piece of evidence in favour of the exchange (repayment) motivations to remit. Unsurprisingly, as any remittance theory predicts, we find that the presence of close relatives in the country of origin affects both the decisions on whether to remit and the amount actually remitted in a positive way 23 .
The distance from the home country and the cost of contacts with the origin family have inconsistent effects on remittances. For example, altruistic senders might be discouraged from transferring money back home if their sentiment decreases with the distance from the family. Similarly, selfish senders might be discouraged from remitting faraway, if we admit that the enforcement of exchanges with relatives at home can become more difficult with the distance. However, by saving on visit expenses, immigrants, whether altruistic or selfish, can afford to send more money back home. Further, if remittances repay migration costs, transfers to the home country should increase with geographic distance. Our results show that distance plays a significant role both in the main equation and in the selection process. The farther the country of origin 22 In a similar vein, the effects of legal status of the immigrant on remittances are not consistent across the literature. For example, Konica and Filer (2009) report that legal Albanian emigrants remit more than their illegal counterparts; by contrast, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) and Markova and Reilly (2007) found an opposite correlation for the case, respectively, of documented Mexican and Bulgarian emigrants. 23 Again in Funkhouser (1995) family relationships are shown to be relevant both to the decision whether to remit and to the amount of money remitted. See also Clark and Drinkwater (2007) .
from Australia, the lower the propensity to remit and the lower the amount of money remitted 24 .
As we stated, the LSIA survey does not contain information on the immigrants' family of origin. In order to circumvent this deficiency to some degree, we exploit the crosssectional nature of the dataset by introducing country-level variables. In particular, in the baseline model we control for the per capita GDP in the immigrant country of origin. Regression results show that GDP exerts opposite effects in the main equation and the selection equation: the income of immigrants being equal, the probability for originhouseholds to receive a transfer is lower if they live in a rich country; however, on average the amount of money they receive is higher than for recipients in poor countries. To the extent that GDP in the home country captures the living condition of the family of origin, our evidence is consistent with predictions of the exchange bargaining-type model of Cox, Eser, and Jimenez (1998) . As they show, in contrast to the pure altruism hypothesis, for exchange motivated immigrants an increase in the income of recipients may raise the amount transferred, as the bargaining power of the latter is higher, but decreases the likelihood of remittances, as the benefits of participating in the exchange with migrants are lower for recipients.
With regard to the instrumental variables included in the selection equation (recall that in this case we estimate the reduced form), CHILD and FIRST ENG are negatively associated with the likelihood of immigrants sending money back home, while SPOUSE has a positive effect. Consistent with the previous literature (Clark and Drinkwater, 2007; Bollard, McKenzie, and Morte, 2009; Dustmann and Mestres, 2009) , the presence of children in Australia reduces the probability of immigrants remitting. Somewhat surprisingly, instead, immigrants whose spouses are in Australia are more likely to send remittances 25 . A possible explanation for this finding is that when both wife and husband migrate, relatives of the enlarged family in the country of origin are left devoid of the help of both the adult sons and this increases their financial needs. Moreover, since we are estimating a reduced form, the positive sign of SPOUSE could hide the positive effect of immigrant income on the probability to remit. Finally, immigrants whose best spoken language is English are less likely to transfer money back home than others. To the extent that FIRST ENG captures the strength of social and cultural links to the country of origin, people who still do not consider English as their first language, after three years spent in Australia, probably view their homeland as the main centre of their interests and are therefore more likely to remit.
Robustness checks
Non-IV, Heckit and Tobit estimates
In the last column of Table 1 , we report estimation results from the non-IV doublehurdle model. The comparison with coefficients from IV estimates provide a clear confirmation of the need to address the endogeneity of immigrants' income and consumption. First, when INCOME and CONSUMPTION are not instrumented, the income elasticity of remittances appears to be much lower than 1 26 , while the elasticity to consumption is positive although not significant. Moreover, the effect of education on the amount remitted is economically and statistically less significant than in IV estimates; gender influences the likelihood of remitting but not the amount remitted, and the distance from the country of origin only makes remittances less likely.
To validate our choice to use a double-hurdle model, we perform two Vuong tests comparing this model with, respectively, the Heckit and Tobit models. Table 8 in the Appendix reports the results from the three different models. In order to use homogenous specifications, we compare the doble-hurdle model with the Tobit and Heckit models on the basis of the unrestricted reduced form, thus avoiding to impose overidentification restrictions from the outset. The Vuong test clearly favours the doublehurdle model versus the Tobit model. A selection mechanism needs therefore to be included in the model, non remitters are not simply immigrants financially constrained and we need to model the decision whether to remit as a separate step from the decision concerning the amount to remit. However, the Vuong test fails to reject the equivalence of the double-hurdle model and the two-step Heckman procedure 27 .
Since the double-hurdle model accommodates both the case of immigrants who do not remit because they are unwilling to send money back home and the case of immigrants who are financially constrained, while the Heckit model considers all nonremitters as people who do not want to remit, we can read the result of the Vuong test as evidence that in our sample most non-remitters (if not all) fall into the category of people who are not interested in remitting, instead of being financially constrained.
Country-specific fixed effects
Ideally, one may want to control for unobserved characteristics of the country of origin by using a complete set of country dummies. In our case, however, this is not possible for two reasons.
The most important reason is that, after adjusting for missing values, we have 102 different origin countries, but most of these countries are represented by a very small number of households, often with no remitting households at all. Clearly, the inclu-sion of dummy variables for such countries would cause unsurmountable identification problems and would make little sense anyway.
Secondly, even if we had a large enough sample size for each country, we already have a few country-specific variables in our baseline specification (distance, for one) and including a complete set of country dummies would obviously force us to drop those variables because of collinearity problems.
Hence, we decided to test the robustness of our baseline specification by means of the inclusion of a limited set of country-specific dummies, for those countries from which we had at least 15 households and 5 remitting households. 28 In practice, this is equivalent to grouping all the remaining countries into a residual "other countries"category. This choice led us to including 30 country dummies; it is worth noting that those 30 countries are the origin country for 1637 households out of 2168, so in fact our limited set of country dummies covers 75.5% of our sample.
Results are not reported for the sake of brevity; however, they can be briefly summarised as follows.
• Country effects are very significant: the maximised log-likelihood for the model with country dummies equals −4249.25. Compared with the maximised loglikelihood for the baseline model, this yields an LR statistic of 266.1, which leads to rejecting the null hypothesis of joint insignificance at any significance level.
• However, the remaining coefficients are remarkably stable. Elasticities of remittances with respect to income and consumption turn out to be 0.946 and −2.026, respectively (both significant at the 1% level). All other coefficients are also very similar to the ones in the baseline specification. The only minor exception is the coefficient of GDP PC in the remittance equation, which equals 0.195 with a pvalue of 10.7%, while the coefficient to GDP PC in the selection equation remains negative and very significant (−0.285, with a standard error of 0.056), thus lending strong support to the idea that income in the home country affects remittances mainly via the decision whether to remit or not, rather than via the amounts.
• All diagnostics tests (see subsection 5.1) remain virtually unchanged.
Controlling for other macroeconomic characteristics
In the baseline specification we control for the economic conditions of recipients only by means of per capita GDP in the home country. Here, we add two more macroeconomic variables that can be correlated with the average income capacity of recipients: the average growth of GDP in the period between 1992 and 2000 (GDP GROWTH) and GDP volatility expressed as the standard deviation of ∆ ln GDP in the same period (GDP VOLATILITY). Both these variables contribute to capture the insurance motivation to remit due, respectively, to the long-run prospects and short-run uncertainty in the parental family's income 29 . For example, a positive coefficient on income volatility in the selection equation would indicate that, ceteris paribus, the probability of being a remitter rises if the home country is exposed to stronger economic fluctuations. Results reported in Table 2 show that neither average GDP growth nor volatility prove significant in any specification, even if the sign of coefficients is consistent with the insurance motive. In any event, the robustness of the other results, and in particular the high significance of the coefficients on income and consumption, are confirmed.
6 Remittances, financial development and institutional quality
In the last part of our study, we analyse the nexus between remittance behaviour and the degree of financial development and institutional quality in the immigrants' country of origin. This issue has recently attracted great research effort in the macroeconomic literature on remittances. The effects of financial and institutional development in the home country on the decisions to remit are diverse and inconsistent. On the one hand, the development of financial institutions is likely to influence the level of immigrants' trust in the country of origin as a sound environment in which to invest their own savings and send remittances. Such a channel of influence is especially important for selfish remitters, for whom a solid and trustworthy economic environment can be key factors in determining the geographical allocation of savings. In this vein, Freund and Spatafora (2005) and Niimi and Ozden (2006) indeed show that the level of financial development of the home country seems to have a crucial and positive impact on remittance inflows; similarly, Bettin and Zazzaro (2009) stress the complementarity between remittances and financial systems' efficiency in the economic growth of developing countries. On the other hand, a substitution mechanism could also be at work (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009 ): where credit markets do not function properly and borrowers are constrained in their access to credit, remittances allow recipient households to bridge financial constraints.
The same ambiguity holds for the quality of institutions: well functioning home institutions might encourage migrants to transfer greater sums of money to relatives at home; however, the presence of good institutions can render remittances less urgent. Consistently, the available evidence is mixed. Catrinescu, Leon-Ledesma, Piracha, and Quillin (2009) find evidence in favour of complementarity between remittances and the quality of institutions of developing countries: the positive correlation between the two seems to imply that the growth enhancing effect by remittances is stronger where institutions are sound 30 . On the contrary, Abdih, Chami, Dagher, and Montiel (2008) suggest that remittance inflows and institutional quality can be substitutes, as a great abundance of money remitted increases corruption and worsens the functioning In what follows, financial development is measured, alternatively, by the three standard ratios introduced in the literature by King and Levine (1993) : the share of bank deposits (DEPOSITS) or the share of bank credit to the private sector (CREDIT) or the share of liquid liabilities of the financial system (LIQUID LIAB), all expressed as a percentage of the country GDP 31 . These variables enter the model of remittance dated back to the year of the interview 32 .
With regard to the home-country institutional quality, it is measured by four indexes of risk rating by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG): economic risk rating (ECON RISK), political risk rating (POLIT RISK), financial risk rating (FIN RISK) and the composite risk index (COMP RISK) which results from the synthesis of the previous ones. The financial and economic risk indexes are based on a 0-50 scale, POLIT RISK on a 0-100 scale. The grades from the three indices are then weighted to produce the Composite Risk Index. Regardless of the scale, the highest overall rating indicates the lowest risk, and the lowest rating indicates the highest risk. Also institutional variables enter equation (9) dated back to the year of the interview.
Out of the three different proxies we use for financial development, DEPOSITS and LIQUID LIAB are highly significant (1% level), while CREDIT is significant at the 10% level (see table (3)). The coefficients are always positive in line with the view of finance and remittances as complements, for which countries with more developed financial systems are able to attract larger amounts of remittances. Once we control for financial development, the level of per capita GDP does not play a significant role in the remittance main equation anymore. In the selection equation, however, financial variables do not exert any significant effect on the probability of being a remitter, while per capita GDP is still a powerful explanatory variable. Since per capita GDP is meant as a proxy for the living conditions of relatives in the country of origin, we could conclude that while altruistic motivations matter in terms of propensity to remit, the amount of money remitted is primarily determined by a different set of factors regarding the solidity of the country of origin and its investment opportunities.
Whatever the proxy used for financial development, regression results confirm the importance (and the endogeneity) of immigrant income and consumption for remittance decisions. Estimated coefficients are always significant at the 1% level and their size is slightly larger than in the basic specification (0.99-1.05 for income and 2.10-2.19 for consumption).
Moving on to institutional quality variables, the effects on remittances are mixed (see Table 4 ). The composite risk index has no effects on the main and selection equations, nor has the economic risk index. By contrast, the political and financial risks in the home country exert significant but opposite effects on immigrants' decisions to remit. Consistent with findings for financial development, where financial risks are low, re-31 DEPOSITS), CREDIT and LIQUID LIAB are constructed from the IMF's International Financial Statistics and the World Bank's World Development Indicators. We draw these ratios from Beck, Demirguç-Künt, and Levine (2000) . 32 We also tested the robustness of our results by using the mean value of each of the three financial variables over the period, and results proved qualitatively identical. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we provided empirical evidence about remittance strategies of a panel of immigrants from 125 different countries who recently settled in Australia. By means of a simultaneous-equation model, we set remittances in the broader context of households' work and consumption decisions, hence addressing the potential problem of endogeneity, that has seldom been investigated in the existing literature. The censored nature of the remittance variable is dealt with by estimating a double-hurdle model that provides higher generality than the customarily used Tobit and Heckit models. A LIML estimator was developed to contemplate endogenous regressors (in our case, earnings and consumption) and deal with the selection mechanism at the same time. Our results show that endogeneity is indeed affecting both immigrants' pre-transfer earnings and consumption as determinants of remittance behaviour. Once we take it into account, the evidence goes in favour of exchange motives governing remittances, even if altruistic motivation cannot be excluded. Thanks to the cross-country dimension of our dataset, the last part of our analysis explored the relationship between remittance strategies and the level of financial development and the quality of institutions of immigrants' countries of origin. Although this nexus has already been explored in a number of recent macro studies, ours is the first contribution to investigate it at a micro level in the context of household decisions.
A.1 Pure altruism
In this case, the maximisation problem is:
where C and Y stand for consumption and income, m and p for immigrant and parental family, R is the amount of money remitted, ρ and δ are the individual and market intertemporal discount factors, and γ is the relative degree of altruism. From the first order conditions, it is easy to verify that:
and the elasticity of R with respect to Y m
where S is the amount of services in the home country acquired by remittances, β is its relative utility and α is the relative price. From the first order conditions, it is easy to verify that:
and the elasticity of R with respect to Y m is equal to 1. 
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